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Abstract 
Implicit knowledge influences decision-making in a variety of areas, including conflict 
resolution and decisions about war. Individuals may unknowingly apply implicit knowledge 
from past experiences to present experiences, even if that information leads to less accurate 
decisions in the present experience. The current study is an exploration into how implicit 
knowledge of past international conflicts and fear of terrorism affects recommendations for 
military conflict resolution in current international conflicts. Priming is one way to make implicit 
knowledge salient, and participants in this study were implicitly primed to think of either the Iraq 
War, World War II, or no war in particular before reading a description of the Syrian Civil War. 
Participants reported their recommendations for resolving the conflict in Syria, including to what 
extent they would recommend that the United States intervene using military force. Fear of 
Terrorism, which is theoretically linked to knowledge and attitudes about Middle Eastern 
conflicts, was also measured. Results showed that support for U.S. military intervention in Syria 
was significantly impacted by Fear of Terrorism when participants had been primed to think of 
the Iraq War. This effect was such that, when primed to think of the Iraq War, higher Fear of 
Terrorism predicted greater support for military intervention in Syria. This effect did not occur in 
the other priming conditions. This study extends current research by examining how implicit 
priming of past conflicts and fear of terrorism interact to influence Americans’ decision-making 
in support for military intervention in Middle Eastern conflicts. 
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Is What Is Past Always Prologue? Priming to Past Conflicts and Fear of Terrorism Influence 
Americans’ Support for Military Intervention in Syria 
Wisdom holds that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it, but 
lessons from the past do not always apply to present circumstances. Histories, both personal and 
collective, give each individual a unique understanding of their world and provide resources for 
the decisions they face. Individuals’ past experiences are known to influence outcomes in various 
facets of life, such as the accuracy of decisions in economic decision-making and in social 
behaviors, such as discrimination (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; North, 1994; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). Past experiences vary in their practical relevance when applied to current 
circumstances.    
Humans commonly use the knowledge accumulated and consolidated throughout the 
lifespan in making judgments and decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). However, using knowledge gained from past experience to make judgments 
and decisions in new situations can lead to invalid judgments. Using past experiences to make 
future judgments is problematic when individuals are unaware of the effects that knowledge of 
past outcomes have on current perceptions (Fischoff, 1975). Fischoff (1975), for example, found 
that when participants knew a particular outcome had occurred in a past event, they perceived 
that outcome to be more likely to occur again in a different event, even if those events were 
unrelated. Moreover, the participants were unaware of the impact that this knowledge had on 
their perceptions. Similarly, Schwenk (1988) demonstrated that people experience the illusion of 
control when they have experienced success in their past decisions. The use of unconscious 
collections of past experiences, referred to as implicit knowledge, is associated with a number of 
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biases, including biased emotions and distorted memories (Kahneman & Riis, 2005; Khatri & 
Ng, 2000).  
Implicit Cognition and Priming 
In many real-world situations, the use of past experiences provides benefits, such as ease 
in decision-making in a new setting. The ease of decision making, however, usually requires a 
loss of accuracy. Humans use mental shortcuts through a process of implicit cognition to make 
decisions quickly. Implicit cognition involves associated memories of past experiences that 
shape decision-making and behavior (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Kahneman & Riis, 2005). 
Implicit cognition influences preferences, views, and attitudes in areas related to one’s 
cumulative experiences. Implicit association tests (IATs), for example, measure how implicit 
cognition impacts attitudes and behaviors (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Although 
researchers have use the IAT in a variety of contexts, the clearest application of the IAT has been 
in revealing subtle and unconscious racial prejudices (Greenwald, et al., 1998). Thus, the use of 
implicit cognition typically leads to bias rather than accuracy, but people use implicit cognition 
because of efficiency.   
Implicit cognition operates by establishing neural connections between elements of past 
experiences and related concepts. Connections between elements of past experience and 
conceptual knowledge become strengthened with use and weakened with disuse (Bruer, 1999). 
The strengthening of neural connections among elements of past experiences and conceptual 
knowledge allows for many cognitive effects.  
Priming effects (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) and spreading activation theory (Collins 
& Loftus, 1975; Quillian, 1962) delineate how information from past experiences can be 
activated among neural networks when making new decisions.  The phenomenon of priming 
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occurs when one encounters one stimulus and this stimulus facilitates the processing of 
subsequent stimuli that are either the same as the first stimulus (i.e., direct priming) or 
conceptually related to the first stimulus (i.e., indirect priming; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 
1982). For instance, participants were more quickly able recognize the word “nurse” when they 
had already been primed with the related word “doctor” (Friederici, Steinhauer, & Frisch, 1999).  
 Semantic and conceptual priming refer to meaning and function rather than the structural 
or surface-level elements of a situation. For instance, individuals are more likely to exhibit 
aggressive behavior when primed with images of weapons (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967). This 
effect is due to the accessibility of the second concept, aggression, following the introduction of 
the first concept, a weapon. The priming effect occurs because of the conceptual proximity or 
similarity of these stimuli in neural activation networks. The neural networks automatically 
activate stimuli that share a semantic connection, a connection based on meaning (Schvaneveldt 
& Meyer, 1973).  
The processes of semantic priming have practical implications for determining behavior. 
Research indicates that semantic priming for implicit knowledge influences decision-making and 
impacts behavioral choices. Implicit priming of God concepts, for example, increases pro-social 
behaviors, such as donating to those in need (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Implicit priming also 
impacts strategic social decision-making. Participants who experienced implicit priming to angry 
faces were less likely than those primed to neutral faces to engage in social approach behavior 
(Van’tWout & Sanfey, 2008). The implicit activation of the conceptual meaning of a past 
experience can influence one’s interpretation of a new experience, impacting decisions in a new 
context.  
 
IS WHAT IS PAST ALWAYS PROLOGUE?      6 
 
 
Priming and Military Decision-Making 
Semantic priming allows for current decisions to be influenced by prior situations that are 
similar to the situation at hand. Priming to prior experience with war influences individuals’ 
tendency to support or oppose war. In recent decades, the United States (U.S.) has become 
involved in a number of overseas conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. These past 
experiences with war could influence the decisions of U.S. citizens to either support or oppose 
U.S. military intervention in similar conflicts.  
Gilovich (1981) states that humans tend to make associations from past experiences to 
present experiences based on decision-making criteria, such as availability or current saliency, 
even if the criteria are not actually applicable to the present experience. Participants who were 
primed to think of World War II reported higher levels of support for war as a resolution strategy 
for a hypothetical conflict compared to participants who were primed to think of the Vietnam 
War (Gilovich, 1981). Despite the fact that the hypothetical conflict for both groups was nearly 
identical, those primed to think of World War II were more willing to support military 
intervention. Simply by presenting the stimulus situation of a war in which military intervention 
was well-supported and successful (i.e., World War II), participants increased their support for 
war when faced with a new conflict compared to those primed with a war in which military 
intervention was poorly-supported and unsuccessful (i.e., the Vietnam War). Priming participants 
with memories of past conflicts, however, introduces another factor in human judgment, threat 
salience.  
Priming, Threat Salience, and Past Conflicts 
In making decisions about a conflict, an individual weighs salient threats associated with 
supporting their nation’s involvement in that conflict against those associated with not 
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intervening. Threat salience is the level of awareness or attention an individual gives to a 
particular threat. Salience of the threat of nuclear war, for example, is associated with worrying 
about nuclear war and thinking about the ramifications of nuclear war more frequently (Mayton, 
1987). Implicit priming to a specific past conflict will activate the semantic networks for that 
conflict and, through the process of spreading activation, makes the threats associated with that 
conflict salient as well. Most Americans supported World War II, for example, because the threat 
of Hitler and the Axis Powers dominating Europe was more salient for them than the threat of 
losing American lives and resources in the war effort. Therefore, priming participants to World 
War II made them more likely to recommend intervention in a new conflict (Gilovich, 1981). 
All wars produce threats. Support or opposition for war is determined by the salience of 
the threats associated with one’s group engaging or avoiding war based on those threats’ relative 
accessibility in memory networks and their perceived immediacy within the context (Berinsky, 
2007; Duntley & Buss, 2004; Feaver & Gulpi, 2004; Gartner, 2008; Mueller, 1973). As the 
United States engages in a number of military conflicts, American citizens provide support for 
the war if the threats salient with the war outweigh the perceived costs.  
The Iraq War, for example, was initially well supported by the U.S. public. Public 
support for war in Iraq was based in part on the assumption that military action would eliminate 
the threat of Saddam Hussein and his potential use of weapons of mass destruction. Another 
motivation for armed conflict in Iraq was the continued search for and destruction of terrorist 
cells that had groomed the terrorists responsible for 9/11, including Osama Bin Laden (Bamford, 
2005). In 2003, 85% of Americans supported the invasion of Iraq (Pew Research Center, 2003). 
Since that time, however, there has been “broad agreement among U.S. foreign policy experts, as 
well as much of the American public and the international community, that the threat 
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assessments that President George W. Bush and his administration used to justify the war against 
Iraq were exaggerated” (Kaufmann, 2006, pg. 97). As a result of lack of salient threats, support 
for the Iraq war decreased. In 2014, 75% of Americans believed involvement in the Iraq War 
was not worth the cost (CBS/New York Times, 2014). Perceived salience of threats has 
powerfully influenced support for military action in past U.S. conflicts. 
Some researchers argue that salient existential threats influence support for war. Terror 
Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) suggests that people are far 
more likely to support war when their own mortality salience, or the extent to which one 
understands they may be killed, is increased (Chatard, et al., 2011; Landau, et al., 2004; Willer, 
2004). This suggests that individuals will be more likely to support war when the salience of 
existential threats is high, especially when they or a loved one may be killed in conflict. The 
balance of threat salience shifts towards support for war and military intervention if individuals 
feel as though they have more to lose, either their life or the meaning they have ascribed to their 
existence.  
Fear of Terrorism and Support for War 
Fear of terrorism likewise has been linked historically and theoretically to support for war 
(Altheide, 2006; Borgeson, 2009; Friedland & Merari, 1985, Victoroff, 2005). Although 
increased fear of terrorism is theoretically related to increased support for war, existing empirical 
results are mixed. Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav (2005), for example, found evidence that 
those with greater perceived threat of terrorism were more supportive of aggressive military 
action against terrorist groups, but those with greater anxiety about terrorism were less 
supportive of military action against terrorist groups. Anxiety over terrorism seems to increase 
risk aversion, which stifles a support for military action, whereas the perceived threat of 
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terrorism increases support for military action in an attempt to reduce the possibility of attack 
from a threatening enemy (Huddy, et al., 2005). Friedland and Merari (1985) empirically 
demonstrated that fear of terrorism is directly related to support for counterterrorism measures, 
including military action such as bombing of terrorist bases (even if it may injure civilians) and 
assassination of terrorist leaders. Counterterrorism, however, poses less threat to human lives 
than does military involvement in full-scale war. The threat of war that involves the threat of 
attacks from terrorist actors likely enhances threat salience.   
Fear of terrorism impacts how an individual perceives and assesses the salience of threats 
associated with a war, usually increasing the threat of opposing war (Altheide, 2006; Nellis, 
2009). Altheide (2006) states that those with greater fear of terrorism are more easily convinced 
of the necessity of war and of the dangers that will accompany not taking military action in 
territory where terrorist groups may reside. This proposed relationship between fear of terrorism 
and increased support for war, however, has yet to be shown empirically. 
Americans’ Support for the Syrian Civil War 
Fear of terrorism and perceived threat of terrorism has played an especially important 
role in support for recent Middle Eastern conflicts. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, Americans’ perspectives on Middle Eastern extremist groups have changed drastically. 
The American public’s high fear of terrorism in the years immediately following 9/11 has kept 
the threat of terrorism salient (Crowson, Debacker, & Thoma, 2006), justifying for some military 
action in the region believed to be harboring those responsible. Since 9/11 and the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, any Middle Eastern conflicts are likely to remind the American people of 
the threat of terrorist attacks (DeCastella & McGarty, 2011). Terror attacks of Middle Eastern 
origin are salient and persistently frightening to Americans because, although the conflict itself is 
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far from American soil and civilians, terror attacks are long distance and unexpected by their 
nature (Marshall, et al., 2007). Even subliminal references to 9/11 raise people’s perceived levels 
of threat and thoughts of death (Landau, et al., 2004). Fear of terrorism increases the salience of 
threats for past U.S. conflicts in the Middle East. This increase in threat salience should increase 
support for wars that are associated with terrorism, such as the Iraq War, or those that are similar 
to prior conflicts associated with terrorism.  
In August 2013, Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad used chemical weapons against Syrian 
rebel forces and Syrian civilians (United Nations, 2013). This escalation to the use of chemical 
weapons in the Syrian Civil War compelled the United States government to decide whether to 
use military force to intervene. In September of 2013, President Barack Obama strongly 
advocated for airstrikes on Syrian targets, which would have marked the official beginning of 
U.S. military support to anti-Assad rebels. However, public opinion, as well as the opinion of 
Congress, was resolutely opposed to taking military action in Syria. Only 24% of Americans 
supported U.S. military intervention to intervene in the conflict (Pew Research Center, 2013). 
Additionally, 74% of Americans believed that U.S. airstrikes would create an anti-American and 
anti-Western backlash in the region, and 61% believed any initial military action would lead to 
long-term military commitment in Syria (Pew Research Center, 2013).  
The war-weary American public was not willing to support U.S. military intervention in 
the Syrian Civil War. Americans in general did not perceive the Syrian Civil War to be a war 
worth fighting, perhaps because the threat of negative consequences from the continuance of the 
Syrian Civil War was not as salient for Americans as the threat of American soldiers dying while 
the government spent billions of tax dollars. 
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Hypotheses 
Although most do not support intervention in Syria, some Americans may support U.S. 
military intervention in Syria if primed to implicit knowledge of a past U.S. military intervention 
or if their dispositional fear of terrorism is high. Research has established that priming to implicit 
knowledge of a successful military intervention can increase recommendation for military 
intervention in a new conflict (Gilovich, 1981). However, this research has not been replicated 
with a real conflict scenario. Also, Gilovich used a small sample of only 42 participants who 
were part of a very specific group, Stanford University political science majors enrolled in a 
course on Post-WWI U.S. Conflicts. The effect of priming to past conflicts and their effects on 
real, immediate conflicts needs additional support. Additionally, because research has been 
mixed on the relationship between fear of terrorism and support for war, the current study will 
address this issue. Since the effects of priming to past conflicts and fear of terrorism on support 
for military intervention have yet to be empirically studied together, the most unique contribution 
of this study is its ability to observe the combined impact that priming to past conflicts and fear 
of terrorism may have on support for military intervention. The salience of threats for past 
conflicts that involve terrorism might help resolve inconsistent research on the role fear of 
terrorism has in promoting support for military intervention in war.  
Consistent with past research, the hypothesis of the current study is that Americans will 
be more likely to recommend military intervention as a conflict resolution strategy when primed 
to think of World War II, because World War II was a conflict in which United States 
intervention is credited with eliminating a formidable threat. Americans will be less supportive 
of U.S. military intervention in Syria when primed to think of the Iraq War, because the Iraq War 
was a costly war and was perceived by Americans as inadequately justified.  
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Another hypothesis is that fear of terrorism will be associated with increased support for 
war (Borgeson, 2009; Friedland & Merari, 1985; Victoroff, 2005), especially when the war 
involves the threat of terrorist actors. Therefore, as Americans’ fear of terrorism increases, their 
support for military intervention will increase.  
When primed to think of the Iraq War, however, the effect of fear of terrorism on support 
for military intervention may be exaggerated by the increase in the threat salience of terrorism 
associated with that conflict. As such, we predict that participants who have high fear of 
terrorism will be more likely to support U.S. military intervention in a Middle Eastern conflict 
than those with low fear of terrorism when primed with concepts reminding them of the Iraq 
War.  
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were 166 University of North Florida undergraduate students. Each student 
was enrolled in at least one psychology course and received class credit for their voluntary and 
confidential participation. Although our sample was comprised of college students, implicit 
semantic priming is a relatively universal cognitive phenomenon (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; 
Tulving, et al., 1982) and is generalizable to all age and education levels. The participants 
identified as 19.6% male, 79.8% female, and .6% other with a mean age of 23 years old (SD= 
5.65). Racially, the participants identified as 59.3% White, 12.3% Black, 14.2% Hispanic, 9.9% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 0.6% Native American, and 3.7% other, which is comparable to racial 
percentages in the 2013 U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). 
Procedure and Materials 
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Participants accessed the study via SONA (a cloud-based subject pool and research 
management software system), which provided a description of the research and a link to the 
survey on Qualtrics (an online survey management service). Participants provided informed 
consent in order to continue with the survey.  
Participants first read a hypothetical international conflict scenario with a corresponding 
map. The hypothetical scenario served as the conceptual priming manipulation. In each scenario, 
the conflict scenario described a larger, totalitarian country preparing to invade its smaller, 
democratic neighbor. Each scenario contained the same structure, fundamental information, and 
basic descriptors. Each participant read either the neutral, World War II, or Iraq War form of this 
scenario. These scenarios differed only in irrelevant cues designed to implicitly prime to World 
War II, the Iraq War, or no particular war (neutral scenario). The neutral priming scenario can be 
found in Appendix A and a table of priming cues can be found in Appendix B. Maps that 
accompanied the priming scenarios can also be found in Appendix B. Participants took the 
perspective of a cabinet member of a geographically removed country that was being solicited 
for military aid by the country being imminently threatened by its large, totalitarian neighbor. 
Under this pretense, participants responded to a series of questions to assess their strategy for 
resolving the conflict and to what extent they would choose to provide military support for the 
country being threatened (adapted from Richard & Wang, 2012). Participants rated conflict 
resolution strategies for this conflict using a 6-point Likert scale, with the anchors “Definitely 
WOULD NOT Recommend (1)” and “Definitely WOULD Recommend (6)” at opposite ends of 
the scale. Examples of items for this scale included, “Launch a pre-emptive, all-out attack on 
Country A”, and “Provide humanitarian support to Country B but no military support.” These 
responses were not used in analysis, but maintained consistency in the survey’s flow in order to 
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avoid raising participant suspicions and creating demand characteristics for other measures in the 
survey.  
The measurement for the dependent variable, support for military intervention in Syria, 
was contained in the next portion of the survey. Participants read a brief description of the Syrian 
Civil War (a non-hypothetical, current conflict), which describes the armed conflict between 
Bashar Al-Assad’s Syrian Army and Anti-Assad rebels. The description concluded by indicating 
that some analysts propose that the United States intervene and provide military support to the 
rebels, whereas others maintain the U.S. should take a more passive strategy. This scenario 
description is included in Appendix C. Participants then answered a series of questions assessing 
their recommended strategies for resolving this conflict, including to what extent they would 
recommend that the U.S. provide military support for the Anti-Assad rebels. Participants 
indicated their preferred conflict resolution strategies in Syria and their support for military 
intervention in Syria by using a 6-point Likert scale, with the anchors “Definitely WOULD NOT 
Recommend (1)” and “Definitely WOULD Recommend (6)” at opposite ends of the scale. 
Examples of items for this scale include, “Launch a tactical, all-out attack on Al-Assad’s 
government forces,” “Provide strong military support to rebel coalition forces,” and, “Provide 
humanitarian support to rebel coalition forces, but no military support.” 
Following the measurement of the dependent variable, participants completed a scale 
asking them to list their preferences for proverbs. The proverb preference scale helped mitigate 
the effects that the manipulation and measurement of the dependent variable may have had on 
other measures.  
In addition to the primary dependent measure, participants completed several control 
measures regarding their preferred conflict resolution style and thinking style. The Rahim 
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Organizational Conflict Inventory-II (ROCI-II; Rahim, 1983) is commonly used to measure 
personal conflict resolution style for interpersonal conflicts. The ROCI–II is a 28-item 
questionnaire measuring conflict management styles. The ROCI-II measures five independent 
styles of handling conflict: Integrating (IN), Obliging (OB), Dominating (DO), Avoiding (AV), 
and Compromising (CO).The ROCI-II is measured using a 5-point Likert scale, with the anchors 
“Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree” at opposite ends of the scale. Examples of items for 
the ROCI-II scale include: “When resolving conflict between myself and another person, I try to 
integrate my ideas with those of the other person to come up with a decision jointly,” “When 
resolving conflict between myself and another person, I try to keep my disagreement with the 
other person to myself in order to avoid hard feelings,” and “When resolving conflict between 
myself and another person, I am generally firm in pursuing my side of the issue.” 
Because of the length of the ROCI-II, participants completed additional distractor items 
assessing “aesthetic preferences.” The aesthetic preferences scale consisted of a series of nature 
images with one question per picture assessing the participants’ enjoyment of the picture. The 
distractor task helped break the monotony of the survey and re-energize participants for the 
remaining questions. 
The Analysis-Holism Scale (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007) assessed to what extent 
participants use a more analytical or holistic thinking style, where a higher score indicates a more 
holistic thinking style. This scale uses a 7-point Likert scale anchored by “Strongly Disagree” 
and “Strongly Agree” at opposite ends of the scale. The scale contains 24 items, including, “It is 
more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes,” “Future events are predictable 
based on present situations” (reverse-scored), and “It is not possible to understand the parts 
without considering the whole picture” (Choi, et al., 2007).  
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Participants then completed two subscales of the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), Tolerance for Ambiguity and Preference for Predictability. These 
subscales were both measured using a 6-point Likert scale anchored with the statements, 
“Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”. Each subscale contained 5 items, examples of which 
include “I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my 
life” (reverse-scored, Tolerance for Ambiguity), and “I prefer to socialize with familiar friends 
because I know what to expect from them” (Preference for Predictability; Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994).  
Participants then completed items measuring one of our independent variables, the Fear 
of Terrorism Scale (Friedland & Merari, 1985). The Fear of Terrorism (FOT) Scale measures 
fear of terrorism within several situations using a 5-point Likert scale anchored by “Not at all 
worried” and “Extremely worried”. The scale contains 4 items, “Are you worried about the 
possibility that you or members of your immediate family might be hurt by terrorist actions,” 
“Are you worried about terrorist action in the nation at large,” “Are you worried about terrorist 
action in your local community,” and “Are you worried about terrorist action against US citizens 
abroad” (Friedland & Merari, 1985). Higher scores on the FOT Scale represent higher concern 
and worry over the threat of terrorism. This measurement was included towards the end of our 
survey, which was relatively long, to ensure that the effects of the priming manipulation (which 
took place at the beginning of the study) would not interfere with the measurement of FOT. 
Participants indicated their political views on a 7-point Likert scale from “Very Liberal” 
to “Very Conservative”. Finally, participants answered “yes” or “no” to the questions, “Have you 
ever served in the United States military or are you a part of an officer training program (such as 
ROTC)”, and “Has either of your parents or any of your immediate family members served in 
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the United States military?” As a final manipulation check of the conceptual priming, 
participants were asked to report any real scenario they thought of during the hypothetical 
scenario, although this question was not required to continue. 
Results 
 A factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) compared differences in mean support for 
military intervention in Syria (SMIS) between those with high Fear of Terrorism (FOT) and low 
FOT and those primed with the Iraq War scenario, the World War II scenario, and the neutral 
scenario. High FOT was defined as all scores above the median score and low FOT was defined 
as all scores below the median score. No significant main effect was found for the effect of FOT 
on SMIS, F(1, 156) = 3.31, p = .071. No significant main effect was found for the effect of 
priming scenario on SMIS, F(2, 156) = .82, p = .442. 
In order to observe the simple main effects of high and low FOT on SMIS in each 
priming scenario, we conducted separate ANOVAs for each priming scenario (Iraq War, World 
War II, and Neutral). We corrected for family-wise error rate by using a Bonferroni correction 
for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni, 1936), finding that for any of the three individual 
comparisons a probability of .0167 for chance occurrence or less was required to reach 
significance. A one-way ANOVA for the Iraq War priming scenario revealed significant 
differences in SMIS between FOT groups, F(1,54) = 9.45, η = .39 p = .003, such that 
participants with high FOT reported higher levels of SMIS (M = 3.10, SD = 1.06) than those with 
low FOT (M = 2.26, SD= .98). The one-way ANOVAs run for the WWII priming scenario, F(1, 
54) = .00, p = .996, and the neutral priming scenario, F(1, 48) = .147, p = .703, showed no 
significant differences between those with either high or low FOT. These results are represented 
in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Mean Support for Military Intervention in Syria (SMIS) in the Neutral Priming 
Condition (n = 50), the WWII Priming Condition (n = 56), and the Iraq War Priming Condition 
(n = 56) groups for those with high Fear of Terrorism and low Fear of Terrorism. 
 
Table 1 
Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) Comparing SMIS in Participants with High and Low Fear of 
Terrorism 
Condition df F η 2 p 
Fear of Terrorism: 
Neutral Priming 
 
1 .147 .00 .703 
Fear of Terrorism: 
WWII Priming 
 
1 .00 .00 .996 
Fear of Terrorism: 
Iraq War Priming 
 
1 9.45 .149 .003** 
Note: df= degrees freedom; WWII = World War II 
**p< .01 
 
 
These results demonstrate that fear of terrorism significantly influenced support for 
military intervention in Syria when participants were primed to think of the Iraq War, but not 
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when they were primed to think of World War II or when not primed to think of any conflict in 
particular. These findings were further corroborated by regression analyses of FOT and SMIS 
performed for each priming scenario (see Table 3). When participants were primed to think of 
the Iraq War, FOT significantly predicted SMIS, β = .332, t(54) = 2.587, p = .012. FOT also 
explained a significant proportion of variance in SMIS scores, R
2
 = .110, F(1, 54) = 6.691, p = 
.012. Regression analyses run for the WWII priming scenario, β = .053, t(54) = .389, p = .699, 
and the neutral priming scenario, β= -.102, t(54) = -.710, p = .481, did not show significant 
relationships between FOT and SMIS. 
The differences in support for military intervention when participants are primed with the 
Iraq War might have been due to the priming scenario prompting participants to think of any 
Middle Eastern conflict, not just the Iraq War specifically. As a manipulation check, participants 
indicated if they had thought of a particular conflict during the hypothetical scenario, and if they 
had, they reported the conflict of which they had thought. Only 45% of participants (n = 75) 
indicated that the hypothetical scenario reminded them of a particular conflict. However, this low 
number is not necessarily problematic, as the priming was meant to be implicit and outside of 
conscious thought, but could be realized consciously by some when prompted by the 
manipulation check question. Of those who reported thinking of a specific conflict in the neutral 
and World War II scenarios, 14% and 0% indicated being specifically reminded of the Iraq War, 
respectively. Of those who reported thinking of a specific conflict in the Iraq War priming 
scenario, 37% specifically reported thinking of the Iraq War and 67% indicated thinking of any 
conflict in the Middle East (compared to 43% and 33% for the neutral and World War II 
scenarios, respectively).  These manipulation check results indicate that participants were more 
likely to think about a Middle Eastern conflict when primed with the Iraq War scenario than 
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when primed with the neutral scenario, χ
2
(1,N = 55) = 4.23, p = .04, Cramer’s V = .28 or when 
primed with the World War II scenario, χ
2
(1,N = 42) = 5.40, p = .02, Cramer’s V = .36. 
Table 2 
Percentages of Participants Who Reported that the Hypothetical Conflict Scenario Reminded 
Them of a Specific Conflict: WWII, Iraq War, Middle Eastern (Including Iraq), and Other  
Condition WWII Iraq War Middle Eastern 
Conflict (Including 
Iraq) 
Other 
Neutral Priming 
 
14% 14% 43% 43% 
WWII Priming 
 
34% 0% 33% 33% 
Iraq War Priming 
 
11% 37% 67% 22% 
Note: WWII = World War II 
 
Supplementary analyses (see Table 3) indicated that of our supplementary measures, 
including conflict resolution style (ROCI-II), the Analysis-Holism Scale, Preference for 
Predictability, Tolerance for Ambiguity, Political Preference, and military/family military status, 
only one had any significant influence on our dependent variable, support for military 
intervention in Syria. Scores for items that measured Obliging Conflict Resolution Style 
significantly predicted SMIS, β = .303, t(157) = 3.985, p < .001, and explained a significant 
proportion of variance in SMIS scores, R
2
 = .092, F(1, 157) = 15.880, p < .001, such that a more 
Obliging Conflict Resolution Style predicted increased SMIS. 
 Several of these measures had a significant impact on Fear of Terrorism. Scores for 
items that measured Avoiding Conflict Resolution Style significantly predicted Fear of 
Terrorism, β = .212, t(159) = 2.734, p = .007, and explained a significant proportion of variance 
in FOT scores, R
2
 = .045, F(1, 159) = 7.477, p = .007, such that a more Avoidant Conflict 
Resolution Style predicted increased Fear of Terrorism. Preference for Predictability also 
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significantly predicted Fear of Terrorism β = -.199, t(160) = 2.574, p = .011, and explained a 
significant proportion of variance in FOT scores, R
2
 = .040, F(1, 160) = 6.628, p = .011, such 
that a greater Preference for Predictability predicted decreased Fear of Terrorism. The negative 
relationship between Preference for Predictability and Fear of Terrorism suggests that increased 
Preference for Predictability predicts decreased Fear of Terrorism. Finally, Political Preference 
significantly predicted Fear of Terrorism, β = .184, t(161) = 2.372, p = .019, and explained a 
significant proportion of variance in FOT scores, R
2
 = .034, F(1, 161) = 5.624, p = .019, such 
that greater conservatism predicted increased Fear of Terrorism.  
 
Table 3 
         Correlations between FOT, FOT in Priming Scenarios, Key Supplementary Variables, 
and SMIS 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Avoiding 
Conflict 
Resolution Style 
- 
        
2. Obliging 
Conflict 
Resolution Style 
.345
**
 - 
       
3. Preference for 
Predictability 
.093 .030 - 
      
4. Political 
Preference 
.267
**
 .039 .075 - 
     
5. FOT: Neutral 
Priming 
.389
**
 -.079 .031 .275 - 
    
6. FOT: WWII 
Priming 
.182 -.009 .330
*
 .146 - - 
   
7. FOT: Iraq War 
Priming 
.061 .132 .221 .151 - - - 
  
8. FOT: Overall .212
**
 .025 -.199
*
 .184
*
 - - - - 
 
9. SMIS .096 .303
**
 -.041 .138 -.102 .053 .332
*
 .091 - 
Note: FOT= Fear of Terrorism; FOT: Overall= FOT across all conditions; SMIS= 
Support for Military Intervention in Syria 
*p< .05, **p<.01 
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The positive relationship between Political Preference and Fear of Terrorism indicates that 
holding more Conservative political views predicts increased Fear of Terrorism. Full correlation 
tables of all items can be found in Appendix D. 
Discussion 
 The hypothesis in the current study was that support for military intervention in Syria 
would be increased when participants were primed to think of World War II and decreased when 
participants were primed to think of the Iraq War. It was predicted that support for military 
intervention in Syria would increase for participants with higher levels of fear of terrorism. The 
results of the study did not completely support these hypotheses. Participants with higher fear of 
terrorism gave significantly more support for military intervention in Syria than those with low 
fear of terrorism, but only when they were primed to think of the Iraq War. Priming participants 
to think of the Iraq War does influence their level of support for military intervention in Syria, 
but the direction of this influence depends on the participant’s dispositional fear of terrorism.  
 Results of previous research on the effects of priming to past conflicts on support for 
military intervention show that priming to a well-supported military intervention, such as World 
War II, tends to produce greater support for military intervention in a new conflict than a poorly-
supported military intervention, such as the Vietnam War (Gilovich, 1981). However, our results 
did not replicate this finding, and instead found that there was no main effect of priming scenario 
on support for military intervention. This lack of replication may have occurred because of the 
differences in size and education of the samples. Because the sample in Gilovich’s (1981) study 
had such a specific and deep level of understanding of post-WWI American conflicts, they may 
have been more easily primed to think of the success of military intervention as a conflict 
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resolution strategy from past conflicts like WWII and the Vietnam War, as well as the salience of 
threats from both conflicts. 
 Similarly, theory suggests that increased fear of terrorism should produce greater support 
for military intervention (Borgeson, 2009; Friedland & Merari, 1985; Victoroff, 2005). This 
theory was supported, but only when participants were primed to the Iraq War. This may have 
been because terrorism in the specific context of a possible war elicits an increase in support for 
military action more easily than does terrorism that is independent of a clear threat of war. 
Priming the threat of war alongside terrorism may enhance the salience of the threats for loss of 
innocent human life, leading to support for military intervention.  
The results of the current study are interpretable when considered in the larger context of 
the United States’ recent military interventions in the Middle East and when considering how 
terrorism has influenced these interventions. The U.S. has recently had active military 
involvement in the Middle East, particularly in the areas of Iraq and Afghanistan. In both of 
these conflicts, fighting against terrorism was a contributory motive (Belasco, 2009). The 
availability and relevance of implicit knowledge of these conflicts, as well as one’s dispositional 
fear of terrorism, seem to have some influence over Americans’ decisions to support or oppose 
intervening in yet another Middle Eastern conflict, the Syrian Civil War.  
In assessing a conflict, an individual weighs the threats associated with their nation 
intervening in that conflict against those associated with not intervening. If the threats on either 
side are perceived by that individual as significantly more salient, they will theoretically support 
intervening in the conflict in question. This threat salience may be key in explaining the results 
of this study. Each war or conflict an individual evaluates has a unique combination of threat 
saliences associated with opposing and with supporting intervention in that conflict; these threats 
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will be perceived differently by each individual and will influence their judgment. Variance in 
traits across many individuals, like fear of terrorism, and across situations that impact many 
individuals, like the activation of implicit knowledge for particular past conflicts, shifts the 
perception of threat salience and thereby influences decision-making. Our results show that when 
implicit knowledge of the Iraq War was made active, the threats that became salient for that 
conflict produced greater support for military intervention when participants were predisposed to 
fear terrorism. 
Collective learning is also important in interpreting the results of this study. Priming of 
conceptual knowledge for a group of individuals (such as the American public) involves 
activating implicit knowledge and concepts that are shared by the group. Collective memory is 
knowledge of the past that is built collectively as a society as the society shares information over 
time through social organization, roles, and communication (Schumann & Scott, 1989). 
Collective memory leads to a form of collective learning, shared knowledge that have built up 
through generations and are found in the culture’s language, institutions, and attitudes (Hayek, 
1960). The collective societal memory of a past conflict can bias a present conflict to appear 
more like the past conflict than is accurate (Paez & Liu, 2011). Other research with collective 
memory and learning demonstrates that collective memory is distorted during times of conflict to 
meet the present needs of that society (Bar-Tal, 2011). For example, collective memory for 
conflict has been shown to be biased by justifying the outbreak and continuance of conflict, 
presenting one’s own society in a more positive light, and presenting the enemy or rival society 
in a delegitimizing or negative light (Bar-Tal, 2011). Americans’ have a unique collective 
memory for each conflict, including World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War. Even if 
an individual did not directly experience these wars, theories of collective memory and learning 
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indicate that implicit knowledge of these conflicts would still be communicated and generally 
understood through shared societal functions and attitudes (Hayek, 1960; Schumann & Scott, 
1989). In this study, priming participants to the collective memory of a past American conflict, 
like World War II or the Iraq War, would theoretically increase the frequency of implicit 
parallels falsely drawn between these conflicts and the Syrian civil war, including strategies for 
resolving them (Paez & Liu, 2011). 
 One explanation for the interaction between priming and fear of terrorism is that, by 
priming participants to the Iraq War, participants’ collective memory for the Iraq War was made 
salient, which then biased their perception of the salience of threats for military intervention in 
Syria. Research shows that the Iraq War and the 9/11 terror attacks are closely tied, both 
conceptually and historically (Bamford, 2005). It seems that, due the proximity of the 9/11 terror 
attacks to the Invasion of Iraq, the American collective memory for the Iraq War includes salient 
threats associated with terrorism and the threat of future terrorist attacks. Therefore, by priming 
participants to think of the threats associated with the Iraq War, those participants who are by 
disposition more fearful of terrorism reported higher support for military intervention in Syria, 
whereas those who are by disposition less fearful of terrorism reported lower support for military 
intervention in Syria.  
The results of the current study show that fear of terrorism was not directly related to 
support for military intervention but interacted with priming of past conflicts to impact support 
for military intervention. Perhaps the interaction occurred because being primed to the Iraq War 
activated implicit knowledge of terrorism (Victoroff, 2005; Borgeson, 2009), heightening the 
threat posed by terrorism. Like other constructs, fears and threats of terrorism become integrated 
into our implicit knowledge for a particular event through repeated exposure. These emotions 
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and threatening stimuli become associated with constructs from explicit memories. These 
associations over time become implicit and can have a long-term impact on behavior (Dienes & 
Perner, 1999). 
One of our supplementary variables predicted support for military intervention in Syria 
directly. Those who scored higher for using an Obliging Style of Conflict Resolution on the 
ROCI-II tended to be more supportive of military intervention in Syria. The Obliging style of 
conflict resolution is associated with as having a low concern for self and high concern for other 
parties. Typical obliging behaviors during conflict negotiation and resolution include down-
playing differences between involved parties, seeking common ground, and satisfying concerns 
of the other party (Rahim, 1983). Because those who use an Obliging conflict resolution style 
have low concern for their own interests and high concern for the interests of others, they may 
have been more likely to support military intervention in Syria knowing that it would aid Syrian 
anti-Assad rebels, even at the cost of U.S. resources and lives.  
Several of our secondary variables also significantly predicted Fear of Terrorism. 
Political Preference had a positive predictive relationship with fear of terrorism, such that the 
more conservative an individual, the greater their Fear of Terrorism. This is consistent with past 
research showing that conservative individuals tend to have an increased fear of terrorism 
(DeCastella & McGarty, 2011). Preference for Predictability, a measure of Need for Cognitive 
Closure, had a negative predictive relationship with fear of terrorism, such that the greater an 
individual’s Preference for Predictability, the lower their fear of terrorism. Because so much of 
the fear that terrorism induces is a function of its unpredictable and unexpected nature, these 
results are consistent with research on Need for Cognitive Closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). Those who scored higher for using an Avoidant Style of Conflict Resolution according to 
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the ROCI-II, tend to be more fearful of terrorism. The Avoiding style of conflict resolution is 
defined as having a low concern for self and others in conflict resolution prioritization and is 
associated with behaviors such as passing-the-buck, side-stepping issues, and avoiding 
information about conflict during conflict negotiation and resolution (Rahim, 1983). Those who 
are likely to use the Avoiding conflict resolution style may be more fearful in general, including 
being more fearful of terrorism.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The primary limitation of this project is the possibility for a cohort effect. Most 
individuals in our study fall between the ages of 18 and 28 years old and have no first-hand 
knowledge of World War II. Additionally, some may have been too young to comprehend the 
events surrounding the Iraq War and the September 11 terrorist attacks. If the participants have 
less implicit knowledge to be primed because they lack experience with the conflicts in question, 
the priming manipulation might have a diminished impact. The limited age range and education 
level of the current sample is potentially problematic for external validity. It is difficult to 
ascertain to what extent the results from our sample would generalize to Americans of different 
ages and experiences. Americans who lived through World War II or its immediate aftermath 
might have been more strongly primed by the World War II scenario, leading to more support for 
military intervention. This supposed increase, however, likely would not be influenced by fear of 
terrorism, as terrorist actors were not a major concern during World War II.  
Additionally, the pattern of results observed in the current study might or might not 
generalize to support for military intervention in other conflicts, especially those that occur 
outside the Middle East or for those that do not have a connection with terrorism. This study’s 
pattern of results suggest that the Iraq War condition has not primed participants to terrorism in 
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general, but specifically to Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, which is highly salient for 
Americans’ perceptions of the Iraq War. Primes suggesting a connection with the Iraq War likely 
would not influence support for military intervention in Northern Ireland related to terrorist-
affiliated separatist movements, despite the fact that terrorism is heavily involved. However, 
primes suggesting a connection with the Iraq War would likely influence support for military 
intervention against Boko Haram, a Nigerian Islamic fundamentalist terrorist group. Perhaps 
priming other forms of terrorism, such as domestic terrorism, would not produce the same effect 
of fear of terrorism as priming foreign terrorism, and specifically Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorism (Borgeson, 2009).  
The results of the current study would generalize to support for military intervention in 
other Middle Eastern conflicts, including Iraq, Iran, and Syria and in conflicts surrounding the 
activity of the Islamic State (IS). Americans’ levels of recommendations for U.S. military 
intervention against IS are especially relevant, as President Obama has recently requested that 
the U.S. Congress authorize the use of military force against ISIS (Acosta & Diamond, 2015). 
Further investigation in these areas is important to generalizing our current findings and to gain a 
better understanding of the role that fear of terrorism and priming to past conflicts play in how 
people perceive, understand, and support war and other military intervention.  
Investigation into the role that the media plays in the American public’s perception and 
subsequent support of war and action against terrorist groups is also needed, as the media has a 
pivotal role in the creation of America’s collective knowledge and memory (McCombs & Shaw, 
1972; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004). Mass media provides a critical link by which individuals are 
able to connect their own personal knowledge to the collective knowledge of their society, in 
such a way that their own implicit knowledge is partly shaped by the collective knowledge they 
IS WHAT IS PAST ALWAYS PROLOGUE?      29 
 
 
perceive in the media (Mutz, 1998). The media also have considerable influence over public 
levels of fear of terrorism (Altheide, 2006; Giroux, 2007; Huddy, et al., 2003). Considering that 
the media seems to maintain significant influence in the creation of implicit knowledge of past 
conflicts as well as fear of terrorism, the findings of this study suggest that the media 
significantly influences Americans’ support for military intervention, although further 
examination is necessary.  
Conclusion 
 Learning from past events, whether they are conflicts, terror attacks, or any other facet of 
human experience, is overall adaptive and generally helpful to survival and well-being. 
However, there are times when implicit knowledge or collective memories of past events can 
bias the assessment of new events. In this study, being presented with a new conflict and 
deciding whether or not to support one’s nation intervening in that conflict was biased by 
priming of prior knowledge of past conflicts and one’s fear of terrorism. This study provides 
evidence that it is easier than many Americans may believe to be unduly influenced by past 
conflicts. Threat salience that individuals have in their collective implicit knowledge of a specific 
past conflict may be used to as criteria for evaluating the threat salience of a novel conflict. More 
importantly, one’s dispositions regarding key elements of the novel conflict, such as the threat of 
terrorism in the present study, influence how those collective memories were applied. Finally, 
the results of this study show evidence that Americans’ fear of terrorism can polarize support for 
military intervention, especially when the conflict in question shares characteristics with recent 
Middle Eastern conflicts. The American public, like citizens around the world, should 
understand that information from the past may not always apply to the present. A fresh and 
unbiased perspective is key to accurately assessing any novel international conflict. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
 
Correlations between Fear of Terrorism, Supplementary Variables, and SMIS         
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Avoiding CRS - 
        
  2. Obliging CRS .345
**
 - 
       
  3. Compromising 
CRS 
-.082 .433
**
 - 
      
  4. Integrating CRS .282
**
 -.061 .556
**
 - 
     
  5. Dominating 
CRS 
.238
**
 .249
**
 .015 -.051 - 
    
  6. Preference for 
Predictability 
.093 .030 .030 -.033 .076 - 
   
  7.Tolerance for 
Ambiguity 
.036 -.100 -.169
*
 -.043 -.012 -.387
**
 - 
  
  8. Political 
Preference 
.267
**
 .039 -.150 -.232
**
 .235
**
 .075 -.005 - 
 
  9. AHS .189 .132 .433
**
 .458
**
 -.159 -.105 .050 -.206
*
 - 
  10. FOT .212 .025 -.116 .074 -.022 -.199
*
 .049 .184
*
 -.079 
  
11. SMIS .096 .303
**
 -.103 -.091 .057 -.041 -.054 .138 -.153 .091 - 
Note: CRS= Conflict Resolution Style; AHS= Analysis-Holism Scale; FOT= Fear of Terrorism; SMIS= Support 
for Military Intervention in Syria 
*p< .05, **p<.01 
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Correlations between Fear of Terrorism in Priming Conditions, Supplementary Variables, and SMIS 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Avoiding CRS - 
            
2. Obliging CRS .345
**
 - 
           
3. Compromising 
CRS 
-.082 .433
**
 - 
          
4. Integrating CRS .282
**
 -.061 .556
**
 - 
         
5. Dominating 
CRS 
.238
**
 .249
**
 .015 -.051 - 
        
6. Preference for 
Predictability 
.093 .030 .030 -.033 .076 - 
       
7.Tolerance for 
Ambiguity 
.036 -.100 -.169
*
 -..043 -.012 -.387
**
 - 
      
8. Political 
Preference 
.267
**
 .039 -.150 -.232
**
 .235
**
 .075 -.005 - 
     
9. AHS .189 .132 .433
**
 .458
**
 -.159 -.105 .050 -.206
*
 - 
    
10. FOT: Neutral 
Priming 
.389
**
 .079 -.196 -.133 .154 .031 -.080 .275 .027 - - - 
 
11. FOT: WWII 
Priming 
.182 -.009 -.008 -.080 .078 -.330
*
 .175 .146 -.229 - - - 
 
12. FOT: Iraq War 
Priming 
.061 .132 -.137 -.014 -.122 -.221 .022 .151 -.178 - - - 
 
13. SMIS .096 .303
**
 -.103 -.091 .057 -.041 -.054 .138 -.153 -.102 .053 .332
*
 - 
Note: CRS= Conflict Resolution Style; AHS= Analysis-Holism Scale; FOT= Fear of Terrorism; SMIS= Support for Military 
Intervention in Syria 
*p< .05, **p<.01 
              
